Introduction
The European Union has forced Britain to introduce a more liberal definition of indirect discrimination law, giving the judiciary more scope for interpretation. United States judges have been interpreting an open-ended definition since 1964. This paper explores the possibilities of the new British definition by reviewing the American experience.
In 1971, the Supreme Court, in Griggs v Duke Power Co, 1 outlawed indirect discrimination by developing disparate impact theory. Title VII, Civil Rights Act 1964, provides: 2 "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of 1 401 US 424 (1971) . 2 Section 703(a) (codified as 42 USCS s. 2000e-2). such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin..." Duke Power's Station in North Carolina was divided into five departments: Labor, Coal Handling, Operations, Maintenance, and Laboratory and Test. Work in the Labor Department was the dirtiest and lowest paid. A high school diploma and/or the passing of an intelligence test was necessary to gain employment in, or promotion to, any of the four other Departments. Duke Power employed 95 workers at the Station, 14 of whom were African-Americans. All 14 African-Americans were employed in the Labor Department. Statistics revealed that 34 per cent of whites completed high school, in contrast to 12 per cent of AfricanAmericans. Research showed that 58 per cent of whites, in contrast to six per cent of AfricanAmericans, passed the Intelligence Tests used by Duke Power. Duke Power showed they had not intended that the requirements would discriminate, but failed to show that the requirements were related to job performance. The Supreme Court found Duke Power liable under Title VII and gave its reasoning this short, classic, paragraph:
"Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On the contrary, Congress has now required that the posture and condition of the job-seeker be taken into account. It has -to resort again to the fableprovided that the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one all seekers can use. The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude [African-Americans] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." 3 It can be seen that this disparate impact theory has two broad limbs. First, the plaintiff identifies a disparate impact upon his or her racial group, caused by the defendant. The defendant then has the opportunity to "justify" that disparity with matters related to job necessity.
However, the certainty of this theory was disturbed by the 1989 case, Wards Cove v Atonio, 4 and the legislation that followed. Wards Cove ran salmon canneries in Alaska where skilled (mainly white) and unskilled (mainly Filipino or native Alaskan) workers were divided by separate accommodation, dining halls and pay. A class of non-white unskilled workers brought a case -heavily based on statistical evidence -of disparate impact. A bare majority of the Supreme Court rejected the claim.
The majority held that a plaintiff had to isolate each specific, identifiable employment practice that caused a disparate impact. They also rejected the plaintiff's "in-house" statistics, stating that the proper comparison was between the at-issue jobs (the skilled jobs) and the relevant labour market. For this and other reasons, the decision caused uproar and confusion, leaving Congress to clarify the law. The problem for Congressional reform was summed up by White, J, who stated that an alternative result would mean that any employer with a racially imbalanced workforce could be "haled into court" to justify to the situation. 5 The alternative was to hire in quotas. The requirements in Dothard v Rawlinson were designed to measure the strength of prison officer applicants, but discriminated against women. According to the exception, these requirements could not be separated for analysis and so could be taken as a whole when linking them to the disparate impact upon women. The Wards Cove ruling on the comparison was left unaffected by Congress.
In the meantime, Britain suffered under an even more restrictive definition. Section 1 of the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA 1976) provided:
(b) he applies to that other a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply equally to persons not of the same racial group as that other but-(i) which is such that the proportion of persons of that same racial group who can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not of that racial group who can comply with it, and (ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable..."
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The key phrase here is "requirement or condition." In Perera v Civil Service Commission, 10 the Court of Appeal held that the formula could apply only to discriminatory measures that amounted to absolute barriers to a job, rather than "mere preferences" that put people at a disadvantage, because of race or sex. So, a job advertisement reading "applicants over six feet tall would be preferred" would fall outside of the legislation, under this interpretation. 16 where the African-American applicant was rejected for promotion to supervisory positions in the bank. The employers had no formal criteria for the position, but relied on the subjective judgment of white supervisors. It was held that the doctrine of disparate impact could be applied to challenge such a subjective procedure. O'Connor, J stated: 17 "We are also persuaded that disparate impact analysis is in principle no less applicable to subjective employment criteria than to objective or standardised tests. In either case, a facially neutral practice, adopted without discriminatory intent, may have effects that are indistinguishable from intentionally discriminatory practices ..."
The question now is whether these claims would survive the reforms in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Clearly it would be very difficult -if not impossible -for the plaintiffs in Rowe to prove each criterion caused a disparate impact. Presumably, a court would hold that they were "functionally-integrated practices" and so may be analysed as one employment practice, under section 105's exception.
An example arising after the Act is Butler v Home Depot
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where "sociological and anecdotal" evidence showed that a male culture dominated the working environment and allowed stereotypes about women to prevail. For the selection and promotion of staff there was a near total absence of specific criteria, no written guidelines, no jobs advertised, no formal procedure for discovering vacancies and no reasons given for promotion decisions. held that the defendant's recruitment and promotion practices could be analysed as a whole. 19 However, it would seem that there is a sub-class of cases that are not actionable. The common feature in these cases is that the employer merely acquiesced in the informal procedures. In Ballor v Alcona County Road Commission 20 the plaintiff complained that the word-of-mouth and walk-in recruitment practices of the defendant had a disparate impact upon women. The defendant did not positively encourage this "system." It was held that this nonaction -cast by the court as the plaintiff's "failureto-recruit theory" -did not amount to a "practice" under disparate impact theory. 21 The Court relied on EEOC v Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 22 where it was held that if an employer did not actively encourage word-of-mouth recruitment, it was not possible to identify a specific employment practice as causing adverse impact.
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Ballor and Chicago Miniature Lamp Works are suspect because there seems to be no reason or principle why an employer's acquiescence in discrimination should be lawful. After all, on general tortious principles, an omission amounts to an act. This also sidesteps any notion of vicariously liability. (Why should not an employer be liable for a discriminatory practice operated by his worker?) If a particular culture dominates the working environment, that culture will prevail in recruitment, unless some active steps are taken to counter it. To distinguish cases purely on the ground that in one, the employer instructed staff to discriminate, whilst in the other, he sat back and observed his staff do it, must be against the policy of the legislation and brings the law into disrepute. Further, it goes dangerously close to suggesting that liability is faultbased, which it is not. 24 In any case, it is inconceivable that nowadays an employer would be unaware that an informal recruitment policy would, at the least, perpetuate the status quo, and most 19 See also Stender v Lucky Stores 803 F Supp 259 (1992) (District Court for the Northern District of California) where the employment practice was held to be a "lack of uniform criteria, criteria that were subjective as well as variable, discretionary placements and promotions, a failure to follow set procedures and the absence of written policies or justifications for promotional decisions." In Caron v Scott Paper 834 F Supp 33 (1993) (District Court for the District of Maine) the employment practice consisted of the subjective factors of: "job skills, leading change skills, interpersonal skills, self-management, performance, and versatility," and the objective factor of "length of service." 20 likely, discriminate against groups underrepresented in the workplace.
Until recently most subjective employment practices were lawful under Britain's discrimination law because such nebulous criteria rarely amounted to an absolute bar, or "requirement." For instance, in Perera v Civil Service Commission, 25 the Court of Appeal rejected Mr Perera's argument that several "preferences" (good command of the English language, experience in the UK and British nationality) that could not be complied with, added up to an absolute bar to many of those, like Mr Perera, of Sri Lankan origin. However, under the new definition, "provision, criterion or practice," subjective practices should be challengeable, especially free from any stricture resembling section 105, Civil Rights Act 1991. However, there are two areas that require clarification. First, the practice must cause a "particular disadvantage" (emphasis supplied). But this is quite different from demanding that each practice is isolated. A claimant should be able to establish that several criteria (amounting to a single practice) caused a particular disadvantage to her group.
The second issue is whether the formula covers "acquiescence" cases, such as Ballor and Chicago Miniature. The only similar British case arose Pel Ltd v Modgill, 26 a claim of direct discrimination (disparate treatment) under section 1(2), RRA 1976, which provides that "segregating a person from other persons on grounds of race is treating him less favourably than they are treated." In this case a paint shop in a factory was staffed solely by Asians. Originally, there had been white workers there as well. However, over the years as vacancies arose they were filled by friends or relatives of the Asians through word of mouth; the personnel department did no recruiting. The paint spray work was the dirtiest in the factory and the Asians complained alleging segregation. Slynn, J rejected the claim, stating: "...had there been evidence of a policy to segregate, and of the fact of segregation arising as a result of the company's acts, that might have well constituted a breach of the legislation....We do not consider that the failure of the company to intervene and to assist on white or non-Asian workers going into to the shop, contrary to the wishes of the men to introduce their friends, itself constituted an act of segregating..." 27 Slynn, J is saying, in effect, that there must be a positive act of segregation by the defendant, to fall within the definition given by section 1(2), RRA 1976. In this case, as in Ballor and Chicago Miniature, the employer merely acquiesced in the 25 28 provides that, for the purposes of the RRA, an act includes a deliberate omission. Second, this was a case of direct discrimination arising before it was settled that discriminatory intent was not an element of direct discrimination. 29 As discriminatory intent never has been an element of indirect discrimination, a fortiori Pel v Modgill should carry no authority in such cases. At the least, an employer who was aware of the challenged practice should be liable for a "deliberate omission." It would very difficult for an employer, who say, operated no recruitment procedure, to deny awareness of how his workers were recruited. Thus, under the new definition of indirect discrimination, "acquiescence" cases should succeed in Britain.
The Plantation Economy Cases
The features of these cases are "in-house" statistics revealing a significant disparity in the workforce, and no identified specific employment practice causing the disparity. A conspicuous case here is Wards Cove Packing Co v Atonio. 30 In Wards Cove it will be recalled, the workforce was divided along racial lines in skills, accommodation, and pay. In his dissent, Stevens, J made this vivid observation: "... some characteristics of the Alaska salmon industry described in this litigation ... -in particular, the segregation of housing and dining facilities and the stratification of jobs along racial and ethnic lines -bear an unsettling resemblance to aspects of a plantation economy."
The difficulty was that although the situation appears repugnant to modern civilization, the plaintiffs could not isolate particular practices that caused the disparity. The scenario alone was not enough for the majority, who reasoned that a decision in favour of the plaintiffs: "... would mean that any employer who had a segment of his work force that was -for some reason -racially imbalanced, could be haled into court and forced to engage in the expensive and time-consuming task of 'the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of their work forces. '" 32 Of course, the reasoning is based on the fear of quotas.
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Before discussing the fundamental objection to the quota fear, it is helpful to consider two technical aspects of the majority's decision: (1) the need to identify a specific causal employment practice and (2) the rejection of the plaintiff's "inhouse" statistics for the comparison.
Specific Identifiable Practice
The majority demanded that a plaintiff must identify a specific employment practice that caused the disparate impact. The problem with this strict approach is that it is based on the notion that this element serves to prevent quotas. It does not. This can be illustrated by envisaging a crude -or "fairshare" -theory, 34 that wherever there was a racial imbalance, a successful disparate impact claim would follow. That would drive employers to adopt quotas. The element missing from this notion is "justification." We know that justification can show how far the employer's practice is job-related. What is less obvious is that it can show, in addition, whether the cause is within or without the employer's control, or a proportion of each. For instance, in Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority, 35 the defendant employer was trying to justify a 40 per cent difference in pay between speech therapists (98 per cent female) and pharmacists (63 per cent female). As women were over-represented in the lower paid group, this was a prime facie case of indirect sex discrimination, which the employer was burdened to justify. The employer argued that market forces caused the difference, although their evidence revealed that only an extra 10 per cent pay was needed to recruit a sufficient number of pharmacists. Thus, there existed a less discriminatory alternative of paying the pharmacists 32 The point is that in every case there will be a cause of a proven disparate impact. It will be either the employment practice or something outside the control of the employer (say, the skills of the respective racial/gender groups in the labour market), or a proportion of each. In Enderby, the shortage of female pharmacists caused some of the disparate impact, whilst employer discrimination caused the rest. Here justification not only exempted the employer from liability for causes beyond its control, it also identified the causes of all the disparate impact. If this approach were adopted for plantation economy cases, the issue would not be whether or not there should exist an employment practice, but rather, upon whom is the burden of identifying it, which is a very different question, to which we will return presently.
The Comparison
The Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co v Atonio 37 emphasised that the usual comparison to be made is between the racial make-up of the at-issue (ie skilled) jobs and the racial make-up of the qualified persons in the labour market. 38 Alternatively, where labour market statistics are unavailable, statistics indicating the racial composition of otherwise-qualified applicants for the at-issue jobs could be used. 39 However, this "applicant comparison" has been commonly used, especially where tests are alleged to have a discriminatory impact. 40 In the sex discrimination case Dothard v Rawlinson 41 a comparison between men and women of the general population was used, although that was a highly unusual case where height and weight requirements were likely to discriminate against women in any section of the workforce, nation-wide. percentage of non-white (Filipino and native Alaskan) workers in the cannery (non-skilled) jobs and a low percentage of non-whites in the noncannery (generally skilled) positions. The majority rejected this approach, holding that the proper comparison was between the workforce and the relevant labour market. In addition to the quota fear, the majority reasoned an employer would be forced to defend a situation caused by the dearth of skilled non-white applicants, something which is not the employer's fault. 42 This part of Wards Cove was left untouched by the 1991 Civil Rights Act. There are two technical problems with this particular ruling: (i) fault-based liability and (ii) the rejection of "inhouse" statistics.
(i) Employer's "Fault"
When discussing the type of comparison to make White, J supported the majority view by stating:
"If the absence of minorities holding such skilled positions is due to a dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants (for reasons that are not petitioners' fault), petitioners' selection methods or employment practices cannot be said to have had a 'disparate impact' on nonwhites." 43 In his dissent Stevens, J reminded the majority that any fault by the employer was irrelevant for liability: "This statement distorts the disparate-impact theory, in which the critical inquiry is whether an employer's practices operate to discriminate. Eg, Griggs, 401 US, at 431. Whether the employer intended such discrimination is irrelevant." 44 This is an accurate criticism, but it does not extend to the true problem. First, Stevens, J is correct in saying that whether the cause of discrimination is "innocent," or whether the employer is at "fault," is irrelevant to liability. However, the true problem can be illuminated by recalling Griggs. The Court in Wards Cove overlooked a strikingly similar feature common to Wards Cove and Griggs.
In Griggs the use of intelligence tests discriminated against African-Americans because, as African-Americans, they had "long received inferior education in segregated schools. Griggs it was not an issue whilst the Court in Wards Cove made it one. To take an extreme case, blaming the racial imbalance on the job market was rather like blaming the impact on women of the height and weight requirements in Dothard v Rawlinson 46 on evolution.
The Rejection of "In-House" Statistics A connected reason for rejecting a comparison between members of the workforce was that otherwise an employer would be driven to adopt quotas by the fear of being "haled into court" to justify the situation. 47 This reasoning is undermined by a number of factors.
First, it assumes that the only alternative to the plantation economy situation is quotas. This is mistaken. Another option is to trace the causes of the disparity. As seen above, this can be achieved when an employer is compelled to justify the situation. 48 There are many benefits of this approach. Among them is that the causes of the stratification will be traced. Whatever part is within the control of the employer should be solved fairly quickly. Causes beyond the employer's control will at least be identified and then can enter the political arena for possible solutions. Skills shortages, or education deficiencies, peculiar to a particular group, are two examples.
Another factor undermining the majority's reasoning is that it is based on the notion that doing nothing is lawful. Most would agree that employers are under a moral positive duty to ensure that their business practices are not discriminatory. But the majority's reasoning assumes that this does not extend to a legal duty. It has already been argued that this is wrong in relation to acquiescing in subjective hiring practices. But the perversity of the reasoning can be illustrated by considering again Griggs v Duke Power.
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In Griggs, the only evidence of discrimination before the eyes of the employer was the racial imbalance of the workforce: African-Americans in the dirty, low paid, outdoor jobs, whilst whites occupied the indoor, higher-wage jobs. If the employer had acted on this, it may have traced the problem to the educational requirements and tests, considered their necessity for the job, and abandoned them. Expensive litigation would have been avoided. Duke Power would not have been "haled into court" or forced to adopt quotas, as White, J suggested. Any employer with a racially imbalanced workforce will either change the culpable practice or justify the situation. In the first case there will be no litigation. In the second, any 46 litigation would be succinct. This is because the only issue would be justification, (the employer having already recognised a prima facie case to justify). The perversity -or perhaps, irony -of the Wards Cove decision, is that by encouraging employers to ignore the signs of discrimination, it will lead to more litigation.
The majority decision is further undermined if the case is compared with Griggs in more detail. What the whole court in Wards Cove overlooked was that the comparisons made in Griggs and Wards Cove were the same. In both cases the comparison made was based upon the racial composition of the existing workforce. 50 In both cases no comparison was made between the racial composition of the atissue jobs and that of the qualified population in the labour market (the "proper" comparison according to the Court in Wards Cove). 51 However, in each case the Court presumed that -with this comparison -there was no significant disparity.
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So is it possible to distinguish Wards Cove from Griggs? The answer is yes, but in form rather than substance. In Griggs evidence additional to the comparison was presented. The Court noted that in North Carolina, 1960 census statistics show that, while 34 per cent of white males had completed high school, only 12 per cent of African-American males had done so. Regarding the tests, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) in one case found that use of a battery of tests, including the two tests used in Griggs, resulted in 58 per cent of whites passing the tests, as compared with only six per cent of African-Americans. 53 This "external" evidence, combined with the comparison, was the basis of Mr Griggs' prima facie case.
There was no "external" evidence of that type in Wards Cove. But there was evidence additional to the comparison. First, Wards Cove Packing recruited its skilled workers using its offices in Washington and Oregon. 54 This hiring practice had no relationship to any particular required skill. Second, the skilled and unskilled workers were 50 The Court in Griggs noted that out of 95 employees at Duke Power, fourteen were black, all of who worked in the lowest paid labour department. (At 426-427.) It seems to be a common misconception that in Griggs the comparison was made between the applicants. This probably stems from the evidence that blacks were less likely to have a high school diploma and would perform less well in the tests. What seems to have been overlooked is that this evidence was purely external, and was in no way based upon the qualifications or test performances of Duke Power's employees or applicants. 51 accommodated in separate dormitories and mess halls -a practice likely to reinforce any racial disparities. Third, many unskilled workers testified that they actually possessed the necessary skills to fill some of the skilled jobs. 55 Fourth, there was no promotion from the unskilled to the skilled positions; all skilled jobs were filled solely through the Washington and Oregon offices. The majority simply ignored this evidence. Yet this evidence was substantial. First, overall, it was practically impossible that native Alaskans or Filipinos would be recruited into the skilled jobs and absolutely impossible for a member of the unskilled workforce (nearly all Alaskan or Filipino) to obtain promotion. Second, in any case, it did not need to be the sole basis of a prima facie case; it was only necessary to use it in combination with the comparison of the workforce. Third, it was no less substantial than the additional evidence used in Griggs. (If anything the "vivid" evidence was much more telling.) In Griggs the evidence relating to high school education was state-wide; it did not relate to the local area, which may, or may not have, been exceptional. It also related only to males, which may, or may not have been, typical. Even less certain was the evidence regarding the tests. The Court in Griggs relied on a single EEOC case that based its findings upon a "battery" of tests that merely included the two tests used in Griggs. Yet the Court in Griggs accepted that this evidence, in combination with the comparison of the workforce, formed the basis of a prima facie case.
As far as the comparison is concerned, Griggs and Wards Cove, once undressed, are indistinguishable. The rejection in Wards Cove of the "in-house" comparison amounted to a rejection of Griggs itself. This part of Wards Cove is flawed because it is rooted in fault-based liability and a spurious fear of quotas; and under it, a case like Griggs could not succeed.
The British Position on the Comparison
In Britain, the new definition demands that the employment practice puts or would put persons of the protected group at a particular disadvantage when compared with other persons. The old definition stated that the comparison should be between those groups who "can comply. This does not restrict the comparison to any particular type of pool, and where appropriate, "inhouse" statistics should be acceptable. The issue of "in-house" statistics and quotas has not arisen in the context of the comparison in the UK. There is no rule of law why this should be, but it could be put down to procedure. The British courts, save in redundancy cases, normally accept a theoretical comparison, rather than a real one. This is because real comparisons are impracticable and expensive to make. In the United States most disparate impact cases are class actions, often lasting many years; these justify extensive analysis of the impact of various business practices. In the UK class actions are much less common. 58 Usually, individuals bring claims of indirect discrimination, although the Commission for Racial Equality or the Equal Opportunities Commission support some claims if it considers that this may be of general benefit.
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The Fundamental Flaw of the Quota Fear
The fundamental reason that recognising these "plantation economy" cases will not lead to quotas is rooted in the symmetrical nature of most antidiscrimination legislation, 60 which is based on equality, between ethnic minorities and whites, women and men. So, legislation primarily aimed at protecting and benefiting, say, African-Americans, equally protects and benefits whites, and so on and so forth. Thus the adoption of quotas -which would disfavour, say, whites, or men -would be unlawful, and may amount to intentional disparate treatment (direct discrimination), which often will result in higher damages, and so be an even more expensive option. This argument applies to legislation in both jurisdictions. In the United States, in some 57 The relevant provisions for discrimination on the grounds of sex, sexual orientation and religion are materially the same. 58 circumstances, quotas may be unconstitutional as well.
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Reasons in Favour of Recognising Plantation Economy Cases
So far, we have seen that there are no legal reasons why recognising the plantation economy cases would lead to quotas. In addition, there are number of positive reasons why these cases should be recognised. First, the alternative is to do nothing, which should not be an option for a 21st century civilisation. Second, studies have shown that discrimination causes inefficiencies. 62 As a matter of common sense, if business practices are tainted by race, gender or any irrelevancies, the employer can hardly tell the shareholders that the business is onehundred per cent efficient. Third, as Lustgarten noted, the more the law can strike down barriers such as discriminatory and unnecessary selection criteria, in Great Britain at least, with its small ethnic minority population, 63 in purely numerical terms, more unqualified whites stand to benefit than those minorities at whom the legislation principally is aimed. 64 Fourth, the spur to employers to review their practices more carefully would lead to less discrimination. Fifth, the employer is better placed than anybody to identify the cause(s) of any significant disparity within its workforce.
Reform
The reform required in the United States is the abolition of section 105, Civil Rights Act 1991. This would leave the phrase "employment practice" in Title VII. Courts would then be left to evaluate whatever evidence is presented when deciding if a plaintiff has a prima facie case. If it is sufficient to raise an inference of a discriminatory practice (which it should have been in Wards Cove), then the employer should be obliged to justify the situation. This will spur employers to monitor the profile of their workforces, and where signs of discrimination are apparent (as in Griggs and Wards Cove), review their employment practices and in doing so, identify the cause(s) of the disparity, as well as perhaps, justify it, or part of it. Note that in practice, this extra burden on employers is non-legal, and should reduce litigation. No legislative reform is necessary in the United Kingdom, although such reform would help clarify matters. Under the new definition, courts should, where appropriate, be able take the same approach and draw an inference of a discriminatory employment practice from significant "in-house" statistics.
Conclusion
Courts in the United States have always recognised subjective hiring practices except where the employer merely acquiesces in the practice. But this exception has developed in neglect of tortious liability for omissions, and vicariously liability and means that an employer merely can watch his workers engage in discriminatory practices and escape liability. Such a distinction is legally unsound, against the policy of the legislation, and brings the law into disrepute. In the United Kingdom, the reversal of Perera v Civil Service Commission 65 by the new definition of indirect discrimination opens the way for subjective hiring practices to be challenged. There is no reason why the courts should develop an exception for mere acquiescence.
Recognising plantation economy cases will not lead to quotas because: (1) the symmetrical nature of the legislation, renders quotas unlawful, leaving an employer to face even more litigation; (2) demanding that the plaintiff isolates a causal specific employment practice does nothing to prevent the adoption of quotas, if anything, the element of justification fulfils this role; (3) the element of justification may help identify internal and external causes of racial (or other) stratification; (4) "inhouse" statistics may be used without causing quotas, and indeed were used in Griggs v Duke Power. In addition, we have seen that under Wards Cove, there is likely to be more litigation. In addition there are policy reasons why these cases should be recognised.
In Britain, plantation economy cases should be recognised under the new definition of indirect discrimination. However, claimants should argue carefully to prevent spurious reasoning leading to a misplaced quota fear.
